BANKRUPTCY—MIMSY WERE THE BOROGOVES: A “RIDE THROUGH” THE LOOKING GLASS WITH THE 2005 BANKRUPTCY  ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT by Allyson MacKenna
Western New England Law Review
Volume 33 33 (2011)
Issue 2 SYMPOSIUM: FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
THE CLOSELY HELD FIRM 35 YEARS AFTER
WILKES V. SPRINGSIDE NURSING HOME
Article 14
1-1-2011
BANKRUPTCY—MIMSY WERE THE
BOROGOVES: A “RIDE THROUGH” THE
LOOKING GLASS WITH THE 2005
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Allyson MacKenna
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allyson MacKenna, BANKRUPTCY—MIMSY WERE THE BOROGOVES: A “RIDE THROUGH” THE LOOKING GLASS WITH
THE 2005 BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 33 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 657 (2011),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/14
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE213.txt unknown Seq: 1 27-SEP-11 10:42 
BANKRUPTCY—MIMSY  WERE THE  BOROGOVES: A “RIDE­
THROUGH” THE  LOOKING  GLASS WITH THE 2005 BANKRUPTCY 
ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
“‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scorn­
ful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor 
less.’”1 
“‘The question is’, said Alice, ‘whether you can make words 
mean so many different things.’”2 
Such is the dilemma faced by courts both prior to and after 
enactment of 2005’s Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA).3  Interpreting the statute’s meaning 
may at times feel like trying to interpret the words uttered by the 
Mad Hatter in Lewis Carroll’s beloved book. BAPCPA’s purpose 
was to end abuse of the bankruptcy system and, purportedly, to 
help consumers.4  Yet BAPCPA appears to have ended one of the 
easiest ways for consumer debtors to keep their vehicles when they 
file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, at least if that debtor was lucky 
enough to live in a jurisdiction that allowed auto loans that were 
not in default to “ride-through” a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding.5 
Prior to BAPCPA’s passage, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Ap­
peals was split regarding the options available to Chapter 7 debtors 
wishing to retain their automobiles.6  The debate over this issue 
1. LEWIS  CARROLL, THROUGH THE  LOOKING-GLASS AND  WHAT  ALICE  FOUND 
THERE (1871), reprinted in ALICE’S  ADVENTURES IN  WONDERLAND  THROUGH THE 
LOOKING-CLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 125, 188 (Elibron Classics 2001). 
2. Id. 
3. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109­
8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
4. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2-3, 10-18 (2005) (“The purpose of [BAPCPA] 
. . . is to . . . ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”). 
5. The “ride-through” option, even in circuits that allowed it, was only available 
to debtors who were current on their loan payments. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379 
(3d Cir. 2004); In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 
43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. 
Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989). 
6. The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits did not allow the “ride­
through” option. See, e.g., In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1998); In re John­
son, 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993); In re 
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centered on the language found in section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.7  This language, depending upon how the deciding court in­
terpreted it, offered either three or four options for debtors wanting 
to retain their vehicles.8  In circuits that offered debtors three 
choices, a debtor had to reaffirm,9 redeem,10 or surrender11 her ve­
hicle.12  In circuits that allowed the so-called “fourth option,” how­
ever, debtors had the additional alternative of ignoring the three 
above-listed options and continuing to make payments on their ve­
hicles as they had prior to filing for Chapter 7.13  This fourth option 
is popularly known as the “ride-through.” 
Section 521(2) of the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code clearly 
spelled out the three options of reaffirmation, redemption, or sur­
render.14  The issue that perplexed courts was whether a debtor was 
limited to one of these three options.  Courts split over the language 
of the statute, which required the debtor to choose one of these 
options “if applicable.”15  Depending on each court’s interpretation 
of the statute, debtors in different jurisdictions had different rights. 
This did not lend itself to the uniformity promised by Article I Sec-
Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990). The Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits did allow the “ride-through” option for Chapter 7 debtors. See, e.g., 
In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; In re Parker, 139 F.3d at 673; In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51; 
In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347; Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 882 F.2d at 1547; In re Bell, 
700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). 
7. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006). 
8. Id. 
9. Reaffirmation is an agreement made between a debtor and a creditor in which 
the debtor is allowed to keep the collateral in exchange for promising to repay a debt 
that would otherwise be discharged during bankruptcy. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1378 (9th ed. 2009). 
10. A debtor “redeems” his vehicle by paying the outstanding balance owing on 
the collateral. Id. at 1390. 
11. “Surrender” is just what it sounds like: the debtor chooses to give up the 
collateral. Id. at 1581. 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2). 
13. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 
673 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962 
F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 
(10th Cir. 1989). 
14. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2). 
15. Id. § 521(2)(A) (stating that “the debtor shall file . . . a statement of his inten­
tion with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, speci­
fying . . . that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to 
reaffirm debts secured by such property” (emphasis added)); see In re Price, 370 F.3d at 
375; In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Parker, 139 F.3d at 673; In re 
Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51; In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 
F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348; In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 
1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990); Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 882 F.2d at 1547. 
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tion 8 of the Constitution, which promises “uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”16  The 
debtor was to choose one of the specified options “if applicable.”17 
But when did this choice become applicable?  If the debtor chose to 
keep the car?  Or only if the debtor chose to keep the car by re­
demption or reaffirmation? 
This Note will examine how BAPCPA has affected debtors and 
creditors, and how the “ride-through” option has been a source of 
contention in determining their rights and responsibilities.  Section 
I will examine the options available to debtors prior to BAPCPA. 
Section II will give an overview of how BAPCPA came to be and 
how it has affected consumer debtors in general.  Section III will 
examine how BAPCPA has affected the “ride-through” option for 
Chapter 7 debtors and how courts have interpreted the Code using 
plain language and legislative purpose.  This Note proposes that it is 
time for the courts to be less deferential to the text of the statute, 
and to reach an interpretation of its provisions that is consistent 
with both the text and the purpose of the Act.  Such a common­
sense approach is necessary to reach a consistent body of law that 
debtors, creditors, and courts can rely on. 
I. DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE: A LOOK AT THE OPTIONS
 
AVAILABLE TO DEBTORS WISHING TO KEEP THEIR
 
VEHICLES BEFORE BAPCPA
 
The Bankruptcy Code that was enacted prior to BAPCPA 
spelled out three options available to Chapter 7 debtors having se­
cured loans.18  Debtors could surrender their property, redeem it, 
or reaffirm their agreement with the secured lender.19  When the 
secured property at issue was the debtor’s car, it was often very 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
17. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). 
18. In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, debtors, upon approval, are able to discharge their 
debt and begin with a clean slate. See 11 U.S.C. § 727.  All of the debtor’s property 
goes into a bankruptcy estate, and a trustee liquidates the debtor’s assets, using the 
proceeds to pay creditors. Id. § 704.  A debtor may, however, redeem or reaffirm the 
debt on certain property. See generally id. §§ 722, 524(c).  When a debtor grants a se­
curity interest in collateral to a creditor, which is essentially a lien on the property, this 
is a secured loan. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (9th ed. 2009). In Chapter 13 bank­
ruptcy, debtors do not liquidate their assets, but instead commit to a payment plan in 
which their disposable income is used to pay off their debts for a specified number of 
years. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1322. 
19. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2). 
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important to the debtor not to lose it.20  However, redeeming the 
vehicle was impossible for most debtors filing for bankruptcy.21 
Reaffirming with the secured lender was a possibility, though not a 
right; secured lenders could refuse to reaffirm the loan with the 
debtor.22  Alternatively, the secured lender could offer terms that 
were harsher than the original terms of the contract.23 
A. Not Applicable? Confusion Over the Alternatives 
Section 521(2)(A) of the pre-BAPCPA Code stated, “the 
debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with re­
spect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applica­
ble, specifying . . . that the debtor intends to redeem such property, 
or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such 
property.”24 
Courts allowing the “ride-through” based their decisions on 
the plain language of the statute,25 the perceived notice-giving func­
tion of section 521,26 the lack of remedy if a debtor did not choose 
20. See, e.g., In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 216 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (noting that 
“debtors desperately desire to retain their vehicles and that they will continue making 
their regular payments because transportation is such a crucial element for a ‘fresh 
start’”); see also Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding 
on to Cars, Home, and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 457, 522, 526-30 (2005) [hereinafter Rash and Ride-Through Redux]. 
21. See In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a debtor’s 
only real choices would be either to reaffirm the debt under whatever new terms the 
creditor requires or to surrender the property”); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (stating that debtors would be “unlikely to be able to redeem the collateral in 
a lump sum”). 
22. See In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348 (stating that “reaffirmation requires the 
consent of the creditor in order to comply with [section] 524(C)”). 
23. See In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51 (stating that “[b]ecause reaffirmation in­
volves negotiation between parties with unequal bargaining power and requires volun­
tary agreement by both debtor and creditor, it gives a creditor an effective veto on the 
‘fresh start’”). 
24. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A)  (emphasis added). 
25. In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379 (3d Cir. 2004); see also In re Parker, 139 F.3d 
668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[w]e see no reason to reach beyond this plain 
language”); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347. 
26. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; see also In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 50-51 (finding 
that § 521(2) is meant to provide notice, not to confine debtor to listed options); In re 
Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347. 
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one of the listed options,27 and the “fresh start”28 policy behind 
bankruptcy law in general.29 
Section 521(2) of the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code clearly 
required a debtor to file a statement of intention and to perform 
this intention with respect to secured debts.30  But if a debtor chose 
to keep his car, when did the options of redemption or reaffirma­
tion become “applicable”?  Five circuits held that the words “if ap­
plicable” meant that the debtor was not confined to the options of 
surrender, redemption, or reaffirmation.31 
The Second Circuit recognized the dilemma facing debtors, 
who, by virtue of filing for bankruptcy, would be unlikely to have 
the funds available to redeem their automobile.32  In In re Bood­
row, Mr. Boodrow filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and, pur­
suant to section 521(2), he timely filed a statement of intention that 
indicated his plan to continue making payments on the car.33  The 
credit union that had given Mr. Boodrow the loan claimed that Mr. 
Boodrow was not in compliance with section 521(2), since he did 
not choose one of the three options specifically articulated.34  The 
lender, Capital Communications Federal Credit Union (hereinafter 
Capital), wanted to repossess the car and moved to have the auto­
matic stay lifted.35  Capital further contended that it had the right to 
accept or reject a debtor’s attempted reaffirmation, and that it 
should have the opportunity to negotiate an agreement on new 
terms.36 
27. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; see also Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 
F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Congress provided neither a penalty for a debtor’s 
failure to comply with § 521(2) nor a specific remedy for a creditor as a consequence of 
such a failure.” (footnote omitted)). 
28. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934) (noting that the 
purpose of bankruptcy is helping debtors to achieve a “fresh start”). 
29. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 378 (determining that “we believe that our reading 
comports best with the ‘fresh start’ policy of the Code”); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51. 
30. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006). 
31. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998); In 
re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51; In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347; Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 
882 F.2d at 1547. 
32. In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51. 
33. Id. at 45. 
34. Id. at 46. 
35. Id.  The automatic stay becomes effective when a debtor files for bankruptcy, 
and it bars all collection efforts aimed at the debtor of any kind. See BLACK’S  LAW 
DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009).  Its purpose is to “protect[ ] a debtor’s assets during 
the administration of a bankruptcy case.” In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 46. 
36. In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 49. 
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The court concluded that “[section] 521(2)(A) was intended 
specifically to eliminate the problem that secured creditors could 
not determine what a debtor who had filed for bankruptcy was go­
ing to do with collateral securing a debt,” thus agreeing with other 
circuits and allowing the “ride-through” as a fourth, unspecified, 
option.37  In reaching its decision, the court also looked at the pol­
icy behind the Bankruptcy Code.38  Specifically, the court stated 
[t]he policy embodied in the Code that a debtor discharged from 
bankruptcy should receive a “fresh start” has been emphasized 
time and again by the Supreme Court and this court . . . .  Confin­
ing an individual Chapter 7 debtor to the choices of surrender, 
redemption or reaffirmation can severely interfere with provid­
ing the debtor a fresh start . . . . Thus, if the options listed in 
[section] 521(2) were exclusive, a debtor’s only real choices 
would be either to reaffirm the debt under whatever new terms 
the creditor requires or to surrender the property.  Because reaf­
firmation involves negotiation between parties with unequal bar­
gaining power and requires voluntary agreement by both debtor 
and creditor, it gives a creditor an effective veto on the “fresh 
start.”  Yet, surrender may deprive a debtor of much needed 
property, such as disabled debtor Boodrow’s vehicle in this 
case.39 
Circuits finding that there existed a “ride-through” option also 
found other sections of the Code to lend support to their position. 
Section 521(2)(C) stated that sections 521(2)(A) and (B), requiring 
debtors to state their intention and perform their stated intention, 
would not “alter the debtor’s . . . rights with regard to such property 
under this title.”40  Courts allowing the “ride-through” interpreted 
this to mean that those sections were notice-giving only; these 
courts also found section 521(2)(C) “to be of enormous aid in [the 
interpretation] of section 521(2)(A),” reading sections 521(2)(A) 
and (B) as “not . . . impinging on the substantive rights guaranteed 
by other provisions.”41  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, since 
prior to the enactment of section 521(2) at least one bankruptcy 
court had held that a debtor who was current on his payments could 
continue making those payments without resorting to redemption 
or reaffirmation, and since section 521(2)(C) did “not alter the 
37. Id. at 51. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
41. In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 372 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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debtor’s rights with regard to the collateral,” the bankruptcy court 
could allow debtors this same option.42  Otherwise, the court con­
cluded, the section would alter a debtor’s rights.43 
B. Applicable Indeed—No Other Options Available 
Other circuit courts held that no “ride-through” option ex­
isted.44  These courts read the “if applicable” language of section 
521(2) to mean that if a debtor chose not to surrender the property, 
then he must choose either redemption or reaffirmation, as these 
were then “applicable.”45  Further, in interpreting section 
521(2)(C), these courts decided that a right to keep property by 
remaining current on the existing agreement was not one of the 
“substantive rights guaranteed.”46  Despite bankruptcy’s policy of 
giving debtors a “fresh start,” some courts refused to allow a “ride­
through” that would give debtors a “head start” by allowing se­
cured loans to become nonrecourse loans for which the debtor as­
sumed no personal liability.47  The Eleventh Circuit, for example, 
found “[n]othing in the plain language of the statute provides a 
debtor with an option to retain the property and to continue to 
make payments.”48  It found no reason, then, to allow a debtor this 
“head start” in which “the debtor effectively converts his secured 
obligation from recourse to nonrecourse with no downside risk for 
failing to maintain or insure the lender’s collateral.”49 
The First Circuit joined those circuits that did not allow the 
“ride-through” option for debtors.50  When James and Katherine 
Burr sought to keep their three-year-old minivan without paying a 
lump sum or entering into a new formal new agreement with their 
42. In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992); see 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) 
(2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006). 
43. In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347. 
44. See In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249, 
252 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 
F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990). 
45. See, e.g., In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 848 (“[Congress] intended chapter 7 debtors 
to elect surrender or retention, and then, ‘if’ retention is ‘applicable,’ to specify which of 
the following . . . retention options they intend to employ.”). 
46. Id. 
47. In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516.  In a nonrecourse loan, the creditor would be able 
to repossess the collateral in the event the debtor stopped making payments or other­
wise violated the agreement (such as by failure to maintain insurance), but in the likely 
event that the collateral fetched a price lower than the amount still owed under the 
agreement, the lender would have no remedy against the debtor. See id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 849. 
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lender, First National Bank of Boston (hereinafter the Bank), 
sought to compel them to choose one of the listed options.51  The 
Burrs had not fallen behind on their payments to the Bank, despite 
financial difficulties that caused them to file a Chapter 7 petition.52 
The Bank sought relief from the automatic stay in the event that 
the Burrs failed to select reaffirmation, redemption, or surrender of 
the minivan.53 
Siding with the dissenting opinion in Boodrow, the court 
agree[d] that it . . . [was] perfectly good English[ ] for Congress to 
have phrased [section] 521(2)(A) in the way it did because it in­
tended chapter 7 debtors to elect surrender or retention, and 
then, “if” retention is “applicable,” to specify which of the fol­
lowing three retention options they intend to employ.54 
After all, the court reasoned, “it would be the rare debtor in­
deed who would elect reaffirmation or redemption over the un­
stated fourth option, which neither requires a large lump sum 
payment . . . nor resuscitates personal liability for the underlying 
debt.”55  In light of the fact that this “unspecified . . . option . . . 
would be almost universally employed” if it were allowed, the court 
reasoned that Congress would not have been silent about it.56 
In addition, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stressed “that a 
chapter 7 discharge is a benefit that comes with certain costs.”57 
We do not doubt that redemption is beyond the means of most 
chapter 7 debtors, and that chapter 7 debtors wishing to retain 
consumer goods on which they owe money will, as a practical 
matter, be compelled to enter into reaffirmation agreements with 
their secured creditors.  Nor do we doubt that some . . . creditors 
may use their superior bargaining power to attempt to impose 
additional, creditor-friendly terms in any new agreement.  But 
strictly speaking, debtors are never “forced” to enter into reaffir­
mation agreements; they can always surrender the property and 
be discharged of the underlying debt.58 
51. Id. at 844. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 848; see also In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1997) (Shadur, 
J., dissenting). 
55. In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 847. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 848. 
58. Id. 
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The court also reasoned that the Burrs could not perform this 
fourth option within forty-five days, as required by section 
521(2)(B).59  While section 521(2)(A) required a debtor to state his 
intentions, section 521(2)(B) required a debtor to “perform his in­
tention with respect to such property” within forty-five days.60 
Since it was impossible for the Burrs to finish paying by installment 
under the original agreement terms within forty-five days, this 
clearly was not an option contemplated by the statute.61  The Burrs, 
unlike Mr. Boodrow, could not use the “ride-through.” 
Finally, the First Circuit addressed the issue of voluntariness. 
If a debtor fails to choose one of the three options, the court noted 
that involuntary surrender is perceived as a contradiction to the 
protection offered by the automatic stay.62  The court was uncon­
cerned, however, because it recognized “that most secured creditors 
in circumstances such as these will prefer to enter reaffirmation 
agreements containing identical terms to the old agreements over 
the costs associated with accepting back, and then disposing of, sur­
rendered collateral.”63  The court did acknowledge that it “perhaps 
would have cause for concern if, in fact, the effect of [this section] 
were that most debtors were forced to surrender their collateral.”64 
C.	 The Importance of the “Ride-Through” Debate to Debtors 
and Creditors 
The controversial “ride-through” benefitted debtors in several 
ways.  First, it allowed debtors to keep their vehicles on the same 
terms as they had prior to filing.65  This was important for many 
reasons.  It kept creditors from preying on debtors’ fear of losing 
59. Id. at 847; 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(B) 
(2006). 
60. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A)-(B) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A)-(B) 
(2006). 
61.	 In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 847. 
62.	 See id. at 848. 
63.	 Id. 
64.	 Id. 
65.	 See Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 462.  In jurisdictions 
allowing “ride-through,” 
so long as a debtor remains current on a secured debt and meets other obliga­
tions, such as insuring and maintaining the collateral, the bankruptcy court will 
not lift the automatic stay and allow the creditor to repossess or foreclose on 
the collateral merely because the debtor’s personal liability on the debt will be 
erased by bankruptcy. 
Id. 
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their transportation by raising the interest rates on their loans.66 
Debtors were often willing to accept harsh terms for the sake of 
keeping their cars67 because getting to work and taking care of a 
family are easier with an automobile.68  Debtors who lost their cur­
rent vehicle might have a hard time getting financing for another 
vehicle if they lost their current one, as lenders would not look fa­
vorably on the bankruptcy.69 
Although reaffirmation might be a hardship, debtors often 
fight to prove that they are able to make their car payments.70 
Even when consumers owe more than the vehicle is worth, they 
frequently reaffirm their debt.71  In Coastal Federal Credit Union, 
for example, debtors, the Hardimans, owed $20,000 on a Chevrolet 
only worth $9,000 due to depreciation.72  The family, which in­
cluded three children, did not wish to lose “their only reliable 
means of transportation.”73  Because their other debts were being 
discharged, the family “thought they could make the monthly pay­
ments on the Chevrolet.  [They] acknowledged, however, that it 
would be hard sometimes.”74  In deciding that it was not in the 
Hardimans’ best interest to reaffirm their agreement with the credi­
tor, the court nevertheless allowed the Hardimans to keep the 
66. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 378 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that without the 
“ride-through” option, “debtors would either have to accept possibly onerous terms set 
by the creditor or surrender the property”). 
67. See, e.g., In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 213-14 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (debtor 
agreed to pay $15,438 on his vehicle that had a value of $8,415, at an interest rate of 
15.6%); see also Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many 
Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 522, 526-30 (1993) (noting that debtors employ vari­
ous means in attempting to hold on to collateral). 
68. See, e.g., In re Lorenz, 368 B.R. 476, 479 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (noting 
debtor needed vehicle for “travel[ing] to and from work,” and “shopping for groceries,” 
among other everyday tasks). 
69. See William C. Whitford, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 
2005 Act: A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 143, 145 (“One important reason [why a debtor will want to retain their vehicle] is 
that the debtor, with an impaired credit rating, can expect difficulty replacing a repos­
sessed vehicle with a vehicle of similar quality.”). 
70. See, e.g., Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 166 (E.D. 
N.C. 2008) (indicating that even though the debtors showed a negative net monthly 
income, they tried to reaffirm their debt on the car). 
71. Id. at 166; In re Husain, 364 B.R. at 213-14 (debtor agreed to pay $15,438 on 
his vehicle that had a value of $8,415, at an interest rate of 15.6%). 
72. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 165. 
73. Id. at 166. 
74. Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
667 
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Chevrolet as long as they continued making their payments and 
complied with other requirements, such as maintaining insurance.75 
Creditors had several complaints about the unfairness of the 
“ride-through” option.  Debtors keeping their property by means of 
“ride-through” were no longer personally liable for these debts.76 
While lenders did not lose their right to repossess the property if 
the debtors stopped paying, they had no recourse if the property 
was damaged or destroyed.77  Creditors were therefore forced into 
an involuntary and unfavorable new agreement.78  In a voluntary 
reaffirmation, debtors still would be personally liable despite their 
discharge in bankruptcy.  Moreover, if debtors did not like the 
terms the lender offered in this voluntary reaffirmation, they could 
file under Chapter 13, instead.79  Creditors, such as Capital, argued 
that a debtor without personal liability on the loan would have “no 
incentive to maintain the collateral in good condition or to continue 
making payments if the value of the collateral drops below the 
amount outstanding on the loan.”80  The court in Boodrow agreed 
with the debtor, however, who argued that “there is a great incen­
tive . . . to maintain current on the debt and to preserve the auto 
since he has no means to acquire another auto.”81  Courts allowing 
75. Id. 
76. See In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a debtor’s 
discharge from bankruptcy eliminates personal liability on the loan, thereby theoreti­
cally limiting the amount a creditor could recover if the debtor defaults”). 
77. See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that “[w]hen a 
debtor is relieved of personal liability on loans secured by collateral, the debtor has 
little or no incentive to insure or maintain the property in which a creditor retains a 
security interest”); Michael P. Alley, Redemption, Reaffirmation, Exemption, and Re­
tention in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy: Extinction Looms Near for the Free Ride, 47 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 683, 687 (1999). 
[T]he collateral . . . may be in good saleable condition at the time the debtor 
files for Chapter 7 protection.  If the debtor subsequently defaults after the 
bankruptcy case closes and the collateral has rapidly depreciated through the 
neglect of a disinterested debtor, secured lenders lose their best opportunity to 
sell the collateral at a favorable price and apply the proceeds against the debt. 
Id. 
78. See Ned W. Waxman, Redemption or Reaffirmation: The Debtor’s Exclusive 
Means of Retaining Possession of Collateral in Chapter 7, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 187, 203 
(1994) (stating that creditors are forced “into a new [involuntary] contractual arrange­
ment” that gives the creditor no protection in the case of the debtor’s default). 
79. See In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 848 (1st Cir. 1998).  Chapter 13, however, re­
quires a debtor to commit their disposable income for a specified time period to paying 
back their debts, offering less of a “fresh start.” See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) 
(2006). 
80. In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51. 
81. Id. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the “ride-through” were less than sympathetic to creditors’ 
protests.82 
II. BAPCPA—IT’S NO WONDERLAND 
Given that this disagreement created a circuit split lasting fif­
teen years,83 when BAPCPA was enacted it was a logical opportu­
nity for Congress to clarify and definitively state whether it 
intended to allow the “ride-through” or not.84  Congress, however, 
failed to take advantage of this opportunity.85  The “if applicable” 
language remained in the new Code.86  Once again, courts were left 
to decipher the statute with inadequate guidance.  Once again, Con­
gress’s intent was unclear.87  Once again, consumers were faced 
with a nonuniform application of Bankruptcy law. 
82. Id.; see also In re Carpinella, 201 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996). 
Once a debtor’s discharge is entered and the subject collateral ceases to be 
property of the bankruptcy estate, the secured creditor can freely exercise the 
same rights against its collateral that it possessed prior to the bankruptcy filing 
. . . in accordance with [its] agreements and applicable non-bankruptcy law. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
83. See Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989) (first deci­
sion to allow the “ride-through”); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(denying the existence of this fourth option). 
84. See Chadwick M. Werner, Still Applicable: An Examination of BAPCPA’s 
Perplexing Response to the Ride-Through Debate, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 ART. 3 
(2007). 
It seemed a mere matter of time before this widespread circuit split would be 
sorted out by the Supreme Court.  Congress, however, beat the court to it . . . 
or so it seemed.  While it appears that Congress may have sought to settle the 
issue by amending the language of section 521, it unfortunately did little more 
than add fuel to the fire. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
85. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. § 101). 
86. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
87. See In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 528-29 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). 
Unfortunately, the BAPCPA amendments do not provide a clear answer. The 
amendments are confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self-contradictory. 
They introduce new and undefined terms that resemble, but are different 
from, established terms that are well understood. . . .  Deciphering this puzzle 
is like trying to solve a Rubik’s Cube that arrived with a manufacturer’s defect. 
Id. at 529. 
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A. Congress Attempts Bankruptcy Reform 
Congress made several attempts to update the Bankruptcy 
Code before finally enacting BAPCPA in 2005.88  In 1997, the “Re­
sponsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act” was introduced.89 
This Act “set out the rudimentary elements of means testing90 for 
consumer debtors as well as other provisions protective of con­
sumer creditor interests.”91  While means testing was not a new 
idea,92 these attempts at reform show Congress’s growing concern 
for the rights of creditors.  The fact that bankruptcy filings were 
increasing throughout the 1990s may have influenced this trend.93 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 was introduced in the 
House in February of that year.94  Many witnesses testified at the 
hearings on this reform, including the Consumer Bankruptcy Re­
88. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (2005). The Na­
tional Bankruptcy Review Commission was formed in 1994. Id.  Its purpose was to 
(1) investigate and study issues and problems relating to the Bankruptcy Code; 
(2) evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements with re­
spect to such issues and problems; (3) prepare and submit to Congress, the
 
Chief Justice, and the President a report within two years; and (4) “solicit di­
vergent views of all parties concerned with the operation of the bankruptcy
 
system.”
 
Id. (quoting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4147).  This Commission issued a report containing rec­
ommendations for changes to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 54-55 (1997). “The conceptual 
framework of some of these recommendations was ultimately reflected in BAPCPA 
. . . .” Jensen, supra note 87, at 487. 
89. H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Jensen, supra note 88, at 493. R 
90. Means testing, which is a method for calculating income to determine who is 
eligible to file Chapter 7 and who must file Chapter 13, was eventually introduced by 
BAPCPA. See Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need 
for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1307 (2006) [hereinafter 
A Fresh Start]; Jensen, supra note 88, at 493. R 
91. Jensen, supra note 88, at 493. R 
92. In 1932, President Herbert Hoover proposed that “[t]he discretion of the 
courts in granting or refusing discharges should be broadened” to give more protection 
to creditors. Jensen, supra note 88, at 490 (quoting President’s Special Message to the R 
Congress on Reform of Judicial Procedure, 69 Pub. Papers 83, 90 (Feb. 29, 1932)). 
93. Jensen, supra note 88, at 495.  Representative George W. Gekas (R-PA), tes- R 
tified that “[t]he bankruptcy crisis is epidemic.  A record 1.3 million or more Americans 
are expected to declare bankruptcy this year, more than double the number a decade 
ago . . . .” Id. (citing National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judici­
ary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997)). 
94. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998); Jensen, 
supra note 88, at 496. R 
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form Coalition, comprising many consumer creditors, such as banks 
and finance companies, which “would play a major role in the effort 
to effect consumer bankruptcy reform.”95  Meanwhile, the Senate 
was also working on its own legislation in this area.96  The House 
and Senate worked together to reconcile the two acts, but while the 
House adopted the amended version, the Senate failed to take ac­
tion before Congress adjourned.97 
A year later, Congress took up bankruptcy reform once again, 
introducing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.98  Lawmakers 
supporting this Act were motivated by “the increase in bankruptcy 
filings, perceived loopholes in the law that encourage abuse, the 
need to ‘reinstill a sense of personal responsibility,’ and the cost of 
abusive bankruptcy filings.”99  A later version of this Act was even­
tually vetoed by President Clinton, who cited concerns over the 
lack of balance in holding debtors and creditors accountable; Con­
gress adjourned without overriding the veto.100 
President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act into law on April 20, 2005.101  Interest­
ingly, some commentators felt “the bankruptcy community, the 
bench and the bar, were effectively shut out of this particular bank­
ruptcy bill.”102  Critics agree that the Act was poorly drafted, lead­
ing to “greater interpretive challenges” than under the prior Act.103 
95. Jensen, supra note 88, at 499.  This coalition “also obtained the services of R 
some of the most prominent lobbyists in Washington, D.C. to make its case to Con­
gress.” Id. 
96. S. REP. NO. 105-253 (1998); Jensen, supra note 88, at 512. R 
97. Jensen, supra note 88, at 513-18; see S. REP. NO. 105-253. R 
98. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999); see Jensen, 
supra note 87, at 519. 
99. Jensen, supra note 88, at 519-20 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bankruptcy Re- R 
form Act of 1999-Part I: Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 32 (1999)) (state­
ment of Rep. Steven Rothman (D-NJ)). 
100. Id. at 539; see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. 
(1999). 
101. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
102. Symposium, Old Code, New Code: Views on Bankruptcy From the Bench 
and Bar: Panel 3: BAPCPA: What Do We Know and When Did We Know It?, 4 
DEPAUL  BUS. & COM. L.J. 597, 597 (2006) (also referring to the Act as “BAP­
CRAPA”); see also A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1305 (“[C]redit industry lobbyists R 
and their most dedicated supporters in Congress knew that opening up the drafting 
process would provide an opportunity for rethinking policy choices, so even the legisla­
tion’s typos and technical flaws were not addressed.”). 
103. George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law Developments Under the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 82 N.D. L. REV. 
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B. The 2005 Act and Its Effect on Consumer Debtors 
When BAPCPA was finally passed in 2005, it changed the land­
scape for creditors and consumers.  To illustrate the overall effect of 
the Act, this Note will briefly discuss general changes to the Bank­
ruptcy Code and how these changes have affected those filing. Fil­
ings spiked shortly before BAPCPA went into effect,104 presumably 
because people feared the effect BAPCPA would have on their 
ability to file. 
1. General Changes that Adversely Affect Debtors 
Many of BAPCPA’s changes illustrate the “Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention” aspect of the Act.  Supporters of the new Act claimed 
that this new test, introduced in BAPCPA, was to benefit debtors as 
well as creditors by stopping the majority of debtors from paying 
the increased costs of credit caused by those abusing the system.105 
In the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code, section 707(b) stated, 
“[t]here shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief re­
quested by the debtor.”106  This sentence does not appear in the 
new version.107  Further, section 707(b) in its older form required 
the court to find “substantial abuse” of the system as one reason for 
a court to dismiss a bankruptcy case.108  BAPCPA merely requires 
the court to find “abuse,” a presumably easier standard to meet.109 
Another important change introduced by BAPCPA affects re­
peat filers—those debtors who file for bankruptcy more than once 
within a given year.110  Section 362(c)(3) shortens the reprieve 
granted a debtor by the automatic stay that takes effect when a 
297, 304 (2006).  Singer goes on to state that this is “due to the imprecise language 
frequently utilized by Congress and other drafting issues that do not in many cases 
clearly articulate Congressional intent.” Id. 
104. Press Release, Chapter 7 Bankr. Filings in Mass. Soar to Highest Level in 
Four Years, THE WARREN GRP. (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.thewarrengroup.com/por­
tal/Solutions/PressReleases/tabid/190/newsid751/2350/Default.aspx.  Bankruptcy filings 
are back up to their highest level in four years in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Id. 
105. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1855.  According to Sen. Grassley, sponsor of the 
means test, the implementation of this test would prevent “high rollers who game the 
current bankruptcy system and its loopholes to get out of paying their fair share.” Id. 
This causes other “hard-working, law-abiding Americans . . . to pay higher prices . . . 
because somebody else did not make good on their obligations.” Id. at S1856. 
106. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (amended 2006). 
107. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 707(b) (2006). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3). 
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debtor files for bankruptcy.111  In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
cases, if the debtor has filed another bankruptcy case within one 
year of the current case, the automatic stay, rather than being in 
effect until discharge or dismissal, terminates thirty days from the 
time of filing.112  A debtor may avoid this early lifting of the auto­
matic stay if he can show that the previous filing was done in good 
faith, and not in an attempt to merely hold off creditors.113  If a 
debtor files three or more times within the year, no automatic stay 
goes into effect at all unless the debtor can show he filed in good 
faith.114  Although debtors were more likely to be repeat filers in 
order to keep secured creditors at bay with respect to real estate, 
repeat filers were detrimental to automobile lenders as well, be­
cause they increased administrative costs.115 
In the name of consumer protection, BAPCPA requires debt­
ors to undergo a course on financial management.116  This and 
other requirements for credit counseling117 “are intended to give 
consumers in financial distress an opportunity to learn about the 
consequences of bankruptcy—such as the potentially devastating 
effect it can have on their credit rating . . . .”118  There is debate, 
however, on whether this requirement can really help a debtor who 
is already seriously considering bankruptcy.119 
111. Id. § 362(c)(3)(A). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. § 362(c)(3)(B). 
114. Id. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) and 362(c)(4)(B). 
115. See Whitford, supra note 69, at 152-53. R 
Not only were lenders hindered by the automatic stay if they were to seek 
repossession, but each time a debtor filed a bankruptcy case the lender in­
curred an administrative expense: the lender had to note the existence of the 
case in appropriate company records, so that the lender did not inadvertently 
violate the automatic stay, and had to file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy 
court.  For this reason most importantly, the expected impact of BAPCPA on 
the number of refilings, especially chapter 13 refilings, should significantly 
benefit auto lenders. 
Id. at 153 (footnote omitted). 
116. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(h) (2006). 
117. Id. §§ 101, 109(h), 526-28. 
118. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 18 (2005). 
119. See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 
16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349, 365-66 (2008) [hereinafter A Guide to 
Interpretation]. 
Credit counseling might work for more debtors if they could get it earlier,
 
before their debt loads become unmanageable, but the required briefing
 
comes too late, typically after a debtor visits a bankruptcy lawyer . . . and
 
learns of the requirement.  By this time, most debtors already are in deep debt
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2. BAPCPA’s Effect on Chapter 13 
Although this Note focuses mainly on BAPCPA’s impact on 
Chapter 7 debtors wishing to retain their vehicles, it is important, in 
order to fully appreciate how BAPCPA has changed the playing 
field for debtors and creditors, to briefly discuss how Chapter 13 
filings were also affected by the 2005 Act. Prior to BAPCPA’s en­
actment, Chapter 13 debtors choosing to keep certain collateral uti­
lized a process called “cramdown” to pay less than what they still 
owed under the original contract.120  Essentially, debtors would 
only have to pay what the collateral was worth, not the full amount 
owed on the loan.121  Debtors could achieve this result by bifur­
cating their loan into secured and unsecured sections.122  If a lender 
was lucky enough to have a Chapter 13 debtor who owed less than 
the vehicle was worth, that lender was oversecured.123  In this case, 
the lender would be paid what was owed under the original loan 
agreement.124  Because automobiles and other vehicles depreciate 
rapidly, however, it was more likely that a debtor was left owing 
more than what his vehicle was worth.125  In this case, a lender was 
undersecured.126  Being undersecured meant that the “secured 
creditor [could only] receive the value of the collateral at the time 
of filing . . . plus interest.”127  In other words, the amount of the 
obligation that equaled the value of the vehicle was treated as a 
secured loan, while any amount in excess of the value was treated 
as an unsecured obligation; this severely hampered the lender’s 
ability to receive payment on that portion of the debt.128  In this 
trouble and have terrible credit ratings, so that they may actually improve ac­
cess to new credit by filing in bankruptcy. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
120. For a discussion of BAPCPA’s effect on cramdown, see Rash and Ride-
Through Redux, supra note 20, at 464-65. 
121. Id. 
122. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006).  When a debtor grants a security interest in collat­
eral to a creditor, which is essentially a lien on the property, this is a secured loan. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (9th ed. 2009). 
123. Whitford, supra note 69, at 145. R 
124. Id. 
125. The topic of valuation is outside the scope of this Note. For discussion of 
how courts decide the value of vehicles in bankruptcy proceedings, both pre- and post-
BAPCPA, see Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 463-67. 
126. Whitford, supra note 69, at 145. R 
127. Id. at 146. 
128. See Richardo I. Kilpatrick & Marla A Zain, Selected Creditor Issues Under 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 817, 834 (2005); Whitford, supra note 69, 145-46. R 
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case, a lender must get in line with other unsecured creditors, mak­
ing it unlikely that they would collect this portion of the debt. 
BAPCPA changes how Chapter 13 functions with respect to 
secured collateral such as automobiles.  Section 1325(a) states that 
[S]ection 506 shall not apply to a claim described [in paragraph 5] 
if the creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the 
debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within 
the 910-day [sic] preceding the date of the filing . . . and the col­
lateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for 
the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt con­
sists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during 
the 1-year period preceding that filing.129 
In cases where the debtor has acquired his vehicle within the 
previous 910 days, that debtor will be forced to pay the full amount 
owed under the secured agreement when filing under Chapter 13, 
which is a definite improvement in creditors’ pre-BAPCPA position 
with newer cars. 
Chapter 13 debtors, “[a]lthough . . . well-meaning and optimis­
tic” often did not complete their repayment plans prior to 
BAPCPA.130  BAPCPA’s means test anticipated forcing more debt­
ors to file under Chapter 13.131  With more debtors filing under 
Chapter 13, especially when their first choice may have been to file 
under Chapter 7, it appeared that there could be fewer bankruptcy 
discharges.132  Indeed, as many as two-thirds of debtors who begin a 
Chapter 13 plan are unable to complete it and obtain a discharge.133 
3. BAPCPA’s Changes to Chapter 7 Provisions 
BAPCPA introduced changes to Chapter 7 as well making it 
more difficult for some debtors to file under Chapter 7, which was 
the only option that provided any hope of a “ride-through” in the 
first place. 
129. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a) (2006).  This is the “famous ‘hanging paragraph’” in the Code, coming right 
after section 1325(a)(9), but having no designation of its own.  David Gray Carlson, The 
Res Judicata Worth of Illegal Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 351, 
359 (2009).  It is a prime example of the poor draftsmanship and editing that went into 
BAPCPA. 
130. A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1297-98. R 
131. See Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 459 n.9. 
132. A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1298 (“Now, Chapter 13 is less voluntary R 
and, for several reasons, even less promising as a way for debtors to deal effectively 
with their problems.”). 
133. Id. at 1297-98. 
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The biggest change BAPCPA made affected which debtors 
were eligible to file for Chapter 7 relief.  In an effort to curb abuse 
of the system, BAPCPA introduced a “means test” to determine the 
eligibility of debtors to file under Chapter 7.134  If a debtor attempts 
to file under Chapter 7 and has income in excess of the applicable 
median family income for her state, that debtor will have to over­
come a presumption of abuse.135  Courts may also look at “whether 
the debtor filed the petition in bad faith”136 and at the “totality of 
circumstances” in evaluating whether there is such abuse.137 
BAPCPA requires looking at a debtor’s income, but his “current 
monthly income” is calculated by looking at income over the previ­
ous six months.138  Thus, a debtor may purposely make less in the 
six months prior to filing.139  A debtor might also think ahead and 
buy property on secured credit, which would be deductible from his 
income.140  Ironically, BAPCPA may “make access to bankruptcy 
difficult for all while permitting relatively well-off persons who plan 
ahead to shelter both income and assets from their creditors.”141 
Despite the many changes BAPCPA made to the Bankruptcy 
Code, Congress did not change the “if applicable” language that 
was the main source of controversy surrounding the previous ver­
sion of the act as applied to the “ride-through” option for debtors 
wishing to keep their automobiles.142  Since these words caused so 
much contention and ambiguity, the drafting of BAPCPA would 
134. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. § 
707(b)(2) (2006). 
135. Id.; see DAVID J. LIGHT, UNDERSTANDING  BANKRUPTCY  REFORM 2005 12 
(LRP Publications ed., 2005) (“The purpose of the means test is to create a presump­
tion of abuse.”). 
136. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A).  While “bad faith” is not defined in the Bank­
ruptcy Code, a debtor who conceals assets is a prime example of a filer in “bad faith.” 
See, e.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374-75 (2007) (finding that 
debtor who concealed a home in Maine had filed for Chapter 7 in “bad faith” and was 
“not entitled to the relief available to the typical debtor”). 
137. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B). 
138. Id. § 101(10A); A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1315. R 
139. A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1316 (“[A] small businessperson could sim- R 
ply take on less work for a period before filing, or an employee could take a lower 
paying job for all or part of the six months before filing.”). 
140. Id. (“[B]uying a new car or a bigger house is a way to pass the presumed 
abuse test.”). 
141. Id. at 1306.  A new decision by the Supreme Court may allow Bankruptcy 
courts to again use their discretion, however, by allowing them to take a more forward-
looking approach that considers expected events in the debtor’s life. See generally 
Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). 
142. 11 U.S.C. § 521. 
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have seemed an opportune time to clarify this language.143  Yet, 
Congress chose not to change these words, perhaps counting on 
other changes to make its intentions regarding the “ride-through” 
option clearer. 
BAPCPA changed section 521(a)(2)(C) so that it now states 
“nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) . . . shall alter the debtor’s 
. . . rights with regard to such property . . . except as provided in 
section 362(h).”144  Section 362(h)(1)(A) states that if a “debtor 
fails . . . to file timely any statement of intention required under 
section 521(a)(2) with respect to such personal property, or to indi­
cate in such statement that the debtor . . . if retaining such personal 
property, [will] redeem such personal property . . . [or] enter into an 
agreement of the kind specified” the automatic stay will be 
terminated.145 
Section 362(h)(1)(B) does appear to give debtors the right to 
reaffirm on the same agreement they had with a secured lender 
before filing for bankruptcy.146  It provides that the automatic stay 
will not be lifted in cases where a debtor attempts to reaffirm on the 
original terms of the agreement and the creditor refuses.147  This 
new language appears to protect both creditors and consumers. 
Creditors will still have a secured loan agreement, making debtors 
still personally liable for their debt if they choose to keep their vehi­
cles.  Debtors, on the other hand, while losing the benefit of keep­
ing their vehicle without personal liability on the amount still owed, 
as the “ride-through” allowed pre-BAPCPA, can avoid higher inter­
est rates or other adverse changes to their agreements that creditors 
may otherwise attempt to impose.148  This seems to be a win-win 
situation, as it protects creditors from damage to, or loss of, the 
collateral and it protects debtors from being forced into agreements 
that are less favorable than the original agreement.  As this Note 
will argue, this solution fits well into an approach that looks at the 
language and the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.149 
143. Werner, supra note 84, at 1. R 
144. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
145. Id. § 362(h)(1)(A). 
146. Id. § 362(h)(1)(B). 
147. Id. 
148. See Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 478. R 
149. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (consider­
ing the purpose of bankruptcy law and not text alone); see also In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 
1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (Graber, J., dissenting) (citing Marrama that the principal 
purpose of the bankruptcy act is to provide a “fresh start”). 
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III. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS—HOW BAPCPA HAS
 
AFFECTED THE “RIDE-THROUGH” OPTION IN PRACTICE
 
BAPCPA has certainly affected how debtors and their attor­
neys approach bankruptcy cases.  It has also led to varied reasoning 
among the courts as they try to interpret the new Code.  Most 
courts agree that BAPCPA ended the “ride-through” previously 
available to debtors, at least in those circuits that allowed the op­
tion and relied only on debtor silence to trigger its protection. 
Circuits that had read the older version of the Code to disallow 
consumer “ride-through” for automobiles were unlikely to change 
their views under the new Code. The “if applicable” language that 
these courts had understood as foreclosing the possibility of “ride­
through” was still in place, and with the additional requirements of 
section 362(h), it was doubtful these courts would change their 
minds. 
The circuits that had allowed the “ride-through” option to 
debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases have had the steepest learn­
ing curve in applying the new Code.150  Nevertheless, some courts 
have continued to allow at least a limited “ride-through.”151  While 
these decisions are not based on the same reasoning as the courts 
used to allow the “ride-through” pre-BAPCPA, they do offer a 
more limited group of consumer debtors the same benefits. 
When courts attempt to interpret BAPCPA they often look at 
the plain meaning of the text to reach a determination of how each 
section should be applied.  This plain meaning approach, however, 
was the leading cause of the pre-BAPCPA circuit split.152  With the 
enactment of BAPCPA, courts are still unable to agree on the plain 
meaning of sections relevant to this very important issue facing 
debtors and creditors alike. 
150. Cf. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 1104; Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. 161 
(Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2008); In re Chim, 381 B.R. 191 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008); In re Blake-
ley, 363 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007); In re Ertha Rice, No. 06-10975 (JFK), 2007 
WL 781893 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2007); In re Hue Huu Tran, No. 07-12512-SSM, 
2007 WL 4210559 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 27, 2007); In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2007); In re Lorenz, 368 B.R. 476 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Donald, 343 
B.R. 524 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006); In re Hinson, 352 B.R. 48 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006); 
In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 2006). 
151. See Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 187-88; In re Chim, 381 B.R. at 
199; In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007); In re Husain, 364 B.R 
219 n.15. But see In re Hue Huu Tran, 2007 WL 4210559, at *3 (granting debtor the 
chance to amend the statement of intention to choose one of the listed options, but 
holding that the “ride-through” no longer exists as a fourth option). 
152. See supra note 25. 
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A.	 Applying the 2005 Act to the “Ride-Through”: The Journey 
So Far 
Congress did not resolve the issue of whether the “ride­
through” was still a viable option to some debtors.153  There is still 
disagreement over a debtor’s options.154  For debtors, creditors, and 
their attorneys, this has led to uncertainty. Prior to BAPCPA, ex­
perienced attorneys could let prior decisions guide their actions on 
behalf of their clients.  After BAPCPA’s passage, it was up to the 
attorneys to interpret the new provisions and advise their clients to 
the best of their ability.  Attorneys could no longer rely on their 
own experience in this area of the law, and the courts could provide 
no guidance at this early stage.  Assumptions regarding the 2005 
Act have led to decisions that have surprised consumers.155  Credi­
tors were also in for some surprises.156 
Many courts have decided that the new language in section 
521(a) together with the addition of section 362(h) has eliminated 
153. See In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1120 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
The Fourth Circuit suggested simple alternative text that Congress could have 
used if the options were exclusive . . . [yet t]he all-important “if applicable” 
phrase—the very source of disagreement among . . . courts . . . remains intact. 
Congress not only declined to adopt the . . . suggested text, it declined to make 
any change whatsoever. 
Id. 
154. Compare In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1108 (noting BAPCPA abrogated ride-
through of personal property), and In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. at 227-28 (holding that 
BAPCPA has eliminated the ride-through), and In re Ertha Rice, 2007 WL 781893, at *1 
(holding that BAPCPA “eliminated ride-through”), and In re Donald, 343 B.R. at 540 
(“The court is convinced that termination of the ‘ride-through’ option is what Congress 
intended.”), and In re Rowe, 342 B.R. at 345-46 (holding that there is no fourth option 
post-BAPCPA), and In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. at 703 (holding that post-BAPCPA a 
debtor may not choose a ride-through option), with Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. 
at 187-88 (holding that ride-through is available to some debtors), and In re Chim, 381 
B.R. at 199 (holding that ride-through is available where the court rejects a reaffirma­
tion agreement), and In re Hue Huu Tran, 2007 WL 4210559, at *2 n.2 (acknowledging 
that BAPCPA “largely eliminate[d]” ride-through but noting Husain exception), and In 
re Husain, 364 B.R at 219 (holding that even where reaffirmation is rejected by the 
court a creditor may only repossess in the event of default), and In re Hinson, 352 B.R. 
at 52 (holding that creditor could not repossess the car because the debtor offered to 
reaffirm on original terms and was current). 
155. In Dumont, for example, the debtor had her car repossessed with no warn­
ing, several months after her discharge, and while she was making payments that the 
creditor was silently accepting. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1104. 
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (2006); In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. at 438 (creditor 
was not allowed to repossess vehicle because it did not have an “allowed claim” for the 
vehicle as technically required); see also Christopher M. Hogan, Will the Ride-Through 
Ride Again?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 882, 914 (2008) (“Typically, for a claim to be allowed, 
courts have ruled that a proof of claim must be filed, which does not occur in ‘no-asset’ 
Chapter 7 cases.”). 
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the “ride-through” for Chapter 7 debtors.157  A secured creditor is 
thus granted relief from the automatic stay if the debtor does not 
choose one of the listed options—surrender, redemption, or reaffir­
mation.158  On the other hand, while the “ride-through” is no 
longer available as widely or easily as it was prior to the 2005 Act, 
some courts have held it is still available.159  Now that courts have 
begun devising new ways for debtors to take advantage of this op­
tion, debtors and creditors alike will at least be able to move for­
ward knowing what to expect.160  Since case law in this area is still 
evolving, however, it may be some time before debtors and credi­
tors are on as solid a footing as they were prior to BAPCPA’s 
enactment. 
1. Ipso Facto 
BAPCPA removed one of the major obstacles creditors faced 
prior to its enactment.  Prior to 2005, creditors could not rely on 
ipso facto clauses161 to give them any rights to collateral under the 
Bankruptcy Code.162  BAPCPA changes that, as section 521(a)(6) 
removes the automatic stay in cases where a debtor fails to meet the 
157. See generally In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1108; In re Ertha Rice 2007 WL 
781893, at *1; In re Donald, 343 B.R. at 540. 
158. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(h)(1)(B), 521(a)(2); Fees v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV07­
389-S-EJL, 2008 WL 4630668, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 17, 2008); In re Hue Huu Tran, 2007 
WL 4210559, at *1; In re Rowe, 342 B.R. at 345-46. 
159. See, e.g., Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 164-65 (allowing debtors to 
keep their vehicle when the court refuses to approve their attempted reaffirmation with 
creditor). 
160. In both Coastal and Moustafi, for example, creditors did not file a “proof of 
claim” because this was not a typical step taken in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. Coastal 
Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 176; In Re Moustafi, 371 B.R. at 438.  According to these 
courts, however, this step now was critical in order for creditors to have a chance at 
reclaiming the collateral. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 178; In re Moustafi, 
371 B.R. at 438; see also Hogan, supra note 156, at 914 (“Typically, for a claim to be R 
allowed, courts have ruled that a proof of claim must be filed, which does not occur in 
‘no-asset’ Chapter 7 cases.”). 
161. An “ipso facto clause” in a contract “specifies the consequences of a party’s 
bankruptcy.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2004).  Secured agreements will 
often have such a clause stating that filing for bankruptcy is sufficient reason to cause 
the filing party to be in default and to allow the creditor to repossess the collateral. See 
Bob Eisenbach, Are “Termination on Bankruptcy” Contract Clauses Enforceable?, IN 
THE (RED) THE  BUSINESS  BANKRUPTCY  BLOG (Sept. 16, 2007), http://bank­
ruptcy.cooley.com/2007/09/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/are-termination-on­
bankruptcy-contract-clauses-enforceable/. 
162. See, e.g., Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash. D.C. v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 985 (4th Cir. 
1984) (holding that ipso facto clauses were unenforceable). 
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requirements of section 524(c) or section 362(h).163  Section 521(a) 
goes on to state that 
[i]f the debtor fails to so act within the 45-day period referred to 
in paragraph (6), the stay under section 362(a) is terminated with 
respect to the personal property . . . which is affected, such prop­
erty shall no longer be property of the estate, and the creditor 
may take whatever action as to such property as is permitted by 
applicable nonbankruptcy law.164 
Thus, if a creditor has a default provision in its agreement with 
the debtor, this clause may be enforced.  Creditors must still comply 
with applicable state laws, however, in any efforts to regain their 
collateral.165 
Prior to BAPCPA, section 365(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy 
Code prohibited secured lenders from deeming a contract in default 
solely because the debtor had filed for bankruptcy.166  Section 
521(d), however, provides that 
[i]f the debtor fails timely to take the action specified . . . with 
respect to property . . . as to which a creditor holds a security 
interest . . . nothing in this title shall prevent or limit the opera­
tion of a provision in the underlying . . . agreement that has the 
effect of placing the debtor in default under such . . . agreement 
by reason of . . . existence of a proceeding under this title.167 
After BAPCPA, ipso facto clauses were no longer useless in 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Once the debtor fails to reaffirm or re­
deem the vehicle, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code itself prohibits 
the creditor from acting on the default provision in its contract with 
the consumer that allows it to repossess the car.168  The secured 
163. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6). 
164. Id. § 521(a). 
165. See, e.g., In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 539 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (“Creditors 
still must ensure that the contract . . . [complies with] any applicable state laws.”); In re 
Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 351 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (discussing applicable state law regard­
ing ipso facto provisions). 
166. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B) (2000) (amended 2006). 
167. Id. § 521(d) (2006). 
168. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009). The court did caution, 
however, that “where there is no ispo [sic] facto clause in the contract, [the BAPCPA 
provision] does not allow [the secured] creditor to pencil one in.” Id.  The court also 
gave no credence to the debtor’s argument that a bankruptcy case was not a “proceed­
ing” and would therefore not trigger section 521(d). Id. at 1117. 
It would be bizarre if the right to declare someone in default on her car loan 
depended on the happenstance of a proceeding (in the technical sense) being 
initiated for whatever reason in her case . . . .  Accordingly, we hold that the 
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creditor still must comply with state law.169  However, “federal 
bankruptcy law no longer prevent[s]” the repossession.170  What is 
especially troubling about this change in the Bankruptcy Code is 
that once this clause kicks in, the debtor may have no way to cure a 
default, even if state law would normally provide her options to do 
so.171 
2. Coastal’s Surprise 
The plain language of section 521(2) of the old Code led to 
different interpretations among the courts.172  After BAPCPA’s 
passage, a plain language reading of the statute has also led to dif­
fering interpretations.  This has, once again, led to confusion and 
nonuniform application of the statute.  Not only have courts looked 
at the “if applicable” language in applying a plain meaning, but 
courts have also applied a plain meaning to several other terms, 
such as “allowed claim” and “purchase price.”173 
The “ride-through” option is still available to some debtors in 
some circuits.  In Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Hardiman, the 
district court held that a modified version of the “ride-through” was 
available, at least for debtors without an attorney, if that debtor 
“timely enter[ed] into a reaffirmation agreement concerning per­
sonal property with their creditor and submit[ted it] to the bank­
ruptcy court, but the bankruptcy court refuse[d] to approve the 
reaffirmation agreement.”174  Coastal believed that the failure of 
the court to find that the reaffirmation was in the debtors’ best in­
terest meant that the automatic stay was lifted and that it could 
debtor’s filing of a Chapter 7 petition initiates a ‘proceeding’ for the purposes 
of section 521(d). 
Id. 
169. Id. at 1115. 
170. Id. 
171. The Fourth Circuit recently held that since BAPCPA ended the “ride­
through,” a creditor had the right to repossess the debtor’s car without giving notice of 
default and a right to cure required under state law, since the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition, which caused the default, cannot be cured. In re Jones, 591 F.3d 308, 313 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
172. Compare In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that debtor 
must choose one of the listed options only “if applicable” and stating, “[w]e see no 
reason to reach beyond this plain language”), with In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1384 
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that debtor must choose one of the listed options based on the 
plain language of the Bankruptcy Code). 
173. Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 178-84 (E.D.N.C. 
2008) (using the plain meaning of the statute to require creditors meet the technical 
requirements of having an “allowed claim” for the “purchase price”). 
174. Id. at 165. 
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repossess the car.175  The district court affirmed the decision of the 
bankruptcy court and held that the automatic stay was still in 
place.176  The district court, applying the reasoning of the bank­
ruptcy court, reached this decision “[b]ecause court approval of a 
reaffirmation agreement is not an element of [sections] 521(a)(2) 
and 362(h)(1).”177  Although the reaffirmation was ultimately not 
approved by the bankruptcy court, “the debtors complied with the 
requirements of the Code by doing everything within their control 
to reaffirm the debt to Coastal.  While ‘ride-through’ is not a stand­
alone option . . . it may, in limited circumstances, occur as a result 
of a debtor’s attempt to reaffirm.”178 
Coastal argued that the plain meaning of the applicable provi­
sions should not apply because “they lead to absurd results, and . . . 
they run manifestly counter to clearly expressed Congressional in­
tent in BAPCPA’s legislative history.”179  The court rejected the ap­
plication of the absurdity exception to the relevant provisions 
because “[e]ven if the result compelled by the plain language is 
‘anomalous,’ ‘unreasonable,’ or even ‘quite unreasonable,’ it must 
stand if Congress could plausibly have made that choice.”180  The 
court also rejected the intent exception proposed by Coastal, stating 
“the intent exception does not apply merely because a statute ap­
pears to be unreasonable in light of general bankruptcy policy.”181 
In order to successfully show that the plain meaning is not what 
Congress intended, “the party challenging the plain language must 
affirmatively show that the plain language is demonstrably contrary 
to the legislature’s intentions.”182 
Section 521(a)(6) of the Code requires a creditor to have an 
“allowed claim” for the “purchase price” of the collateral.183  Tech­
nically, in order to have an “allowed claim,” a creditor must file a 
“proof of claim,” something that was not done prior to BAPCPA in 
Chapter 7 cases.184  Further, the “purchase price” for the collateral 
175. Id. at 166. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 166-67. 
179. Id. at 167. 
180. Id. at 168 (quoting In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 267-68 (4th Cir. 
2004)). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 521(a)(6) (2006). 
184. Hogan, supra note 156, at 914. R 
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is technically the full amount for which the collateral is sold.185 
Some courts, however, have found that these terms should not be 
read literally.186 
The Coastal court found that “purchase price” was different 
from “purchase money security interest.”187  “Purchase price” only 
applied to the full purchase price.188  This was a blow to secured 
creditors of vehicles because once a creditor had received even one 
payment on an auto loan, they no longer had a claim for the 
“purchase price.”189  Under these plain meaning interpretations, 
Coastal did not have an “allowed claim” for the “purchase price” as 
required by section 521(a)(6).190  Applying the literal meaning to 
these terms was not absurd, as Coastal contended.191 
There are at least two possible purposes to be served in applying 
the phrase “allowed claim” in section 521(a)(6) as written . . . . 
First, filing a proof of claim will establish whether the creditor 
has an ipso facto clause that it can invoke.  Second, filing a proof 
of claim will establish whether the underlying contract and lien 
are valid, enforceable, and perfected.192 
Congress could therefore plausibly “have chosen the statutory 
language” in question.193  Coastal also argued that nowhere in the 
Congressional record does it state that Congress meant this section 
to apply only to “allowed claims.”194  The court reasoned, however, 
185. Id. 
186. In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 706-07 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (“[I]t appears 
unmistakable that Congress drafted, or allowed to be drafted by others and then en­
acted, provisions with ‘loose’ and imprecise language.”); In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 349 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (finding that “the intentions of the drafters, rather than the strict 
language, [should] control[ ]”). 
187. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 176.  The court relied on the reason­
ing in Donald, which noted that “Congress had used ‘purchase money security interest’ 
elsewhere in BAPCPA, but did not do so in section 521(a)(6) . . . . Congress knew how 
to use commercial-law terms of art, and chose not to do so in section 521(a)(6).” Id.; 
see In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 536-38 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). 
188. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 176-77. 
189. Id. at 168. 
190. Id. at 178-80. But cf. In re Chim, 381 B.R. 191, 197 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008) 
(assuming that creditor did have an “allowed claim” for the “purchase price”). See 
generally In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341 (interpreting what is meant by “allowed claim”). 
191. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 178. 
192. Id.  The court also noted that, “[a]s [the judge] reasoned in Donald, ‘it is not 
too much to require that the secured creditor file a proof of claim’ before it attempts to 
take property from a debtor who is not behind on payments.” Id. (quoting In re Don­
ald, 343 B.R. at 536). 
193. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 179. 
194. Id. 
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that Congress did not need “to clearly express its intent in favor of 
the plain language in BAPCPA’s legislative history . . . .  The plain 
language in section 521(a)(6)—including the phrase ‘allowed 
claim’—is the best evidence of Congress’ [sic] intent.”195 
Concerning the “purchase price,” the court reasoned that Con­
gress could have meant only “to curb the most abusive of bank­
ruptcy practices: . . . enjoying the personal property [one has 
purchased on credit] while making no payments whatsoever, and 
then filing for bankruptcy immediately before repossession.”196 
Therefore, the court found such a plain language reading plausible. 
Coastal also tried to argue that it had not “entered into” an 
agreement as required by section 362(h)(1)(a).197  The debtors con­
tended that approval of the agreement by the court was not re­
quired under the section, and that they had, therefore, “entered 
into” an agreement as required.198  The court agreed with the 
debtors.199 
B. Words or Purpose? How to Fairly Apply the Code 
There is debate over whether courts should look at a “plain 
meaning” interpretation or whether courts should look at the pur­
pose of the Bankruptcy Code.200  Traditionally, courts have inter­
preted bankruptcy law according to its plain meaning.201  However, 
choosing a strict interpretation without flexibility does not always 
lead to fair results. 
195. Id. at 179-80. 
196. Id. at 180. 
197. Id at 177. 
198. Id. 
199. Id.; see also In re Husain, 364 B.R 211, 218-19 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (con­
cluding that reaffirmation agreement does not have to be enforceable for debtors to 
satisfy meaning of “agreement” under BAPCPA). 
200. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 350 (stating that in a 2007 deci- R 
sion, “the Supreme Court . . . sen[t] a strong message to lower courts to keep purposes 
of bankruptcy law in the foreground as they interpret it”); Thomas F. Waldron & Neil 
M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective Af­
ter Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J 195, 202 (2007) (“Although the Su­
preme Court has repeatedly resolved statutory interpretation issues involving 
bankruptcy by reference to the ‘plain meaning’ of the text, a candid assessment of this 
body of law finds confusion, if not contradiction, in the methodology of these 
decisions.”). 
201. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 352-53.  The author “rejects the R 
notion that a good strategy for dealing with the 2005 law, with all its drafting problems 
and empirically unsupported assumptions, is to latch onto ‘plain meaning,’ catching 
Congress at its drafting errors and using them to try to help hapless debtors.” Id. 
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1. The Supreme Court Speaks: Lessons From Marrama 
In Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, a debtor sought 
to convert his bankruptcy case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13.202 
Under section 706(a), a “debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 
7] to a case under chapter . . . 13 of this title at any time.”203  The 
debtor in this case was motivated to convert because he was caught 
hiding the value of real property he owned, and Chapter 13 would 
allow the debtor to keep this property while Chapter 7 would not. 
Nevertheless, the debtor insisted that he had an absolute, one-time 
right to convert his case to Chapter 13 under the Bankruptcy 
Code.204  The First Circuit denied Marrama this right because he 
had filed in bad faith.205  Bankruptcy courts have the power to dis­
miss Chapter 13 filings “upon a showing of bad faith,” and the First 
Circuit did not see why Congress would allow a debtor the “abso­
lute right” to convert to Chapter 13 when the court could dismiss 
the petition immediately.206  The Supreme Court agreed.207  The 
Court looked to the purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code in deter­
mining that Marrama was “not a member of the class of ‘honest but 
unfortunate debtor[s]’” to be protected.208  Since his attempt to 
hide property was “prepetition bad-faith conduct,” and since 
“[b]ankruptcy courts . . . routinely treat dismissal for prepetition 
bad-faith conduct as implicitly authorized,” Marrama would fail to 
qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13.209  Section 706(d) denies a 
debtor the right to convert “unless [he] may be a debtor under such 
chapter.”210  Prior to the Court’s decision lower courts had dis­
agreed about how to interpret the relevant sections.211 
202. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 368-69 (2007). 
203. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 706(a) (2006). 
204. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 370.  This case was decided under the pre-BAPCPA 
Code. 
205. Id. at 365, 370. The Court in Marrama held that because the request to 
convert was made in an attempt to hide property, and was thus in bad faith, granting the 
request “would constitute an abuse of the bankruptcy process.” Id. at 369. 
206. Id. at 370-71. 
207. Id. at 371. 
208. Id. at 374 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). 
209. Id. at 373. 
210. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 706(d) (2006); see also Marrama, 549 U.S. at 373. 
211. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 371; see 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (“The debtor may convert 
a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time 
. . . . (emphasis added)); id. § 706(d) (“[A] case may not be converted to a case under 
another chapter of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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The Court stated, “[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy 
Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate 
debtor.’”212  By stating the purpose of bankruptcy law from the 
opening sentence, the Court illustrated that the purpose of bank­
ruptcy law plays a crucial role in its interpretation.213  By referring 
again to this purpose in holding that Marrama did not have the 
right to convert his case to Chapter 13, despite the plain text of the 
Code, the Supreme Court has made clear that courts should apply 
rationality to their interpretation of the Code.214 
In Marrama, the Court determined that inquiry should be 
made into the legislative intent behind an act, and that this legisla­
tive purpose should be the guiding principle used to determine the 
proper reading.215  Unfortunately for courts looking to use 
BAPCPA’s purpose to help them make sense of the Act, there is 
little to assist them.216  According to the Ninth Circuit, 
[T]he purposes of the bankruptcy code [do not] provide much 
aid.  Bankruptcy law serves two central but often conflicting in­
terests . . . .  [B]ankruptcy law aims to protect the “honest but 
unfortunate debtor.”  On the other hand, since ancient times, 
bankruptcy has also been seen as promoting creditor interests as 
well.217 
212. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added) (quoting Grogan, 498 U.S. at 
286-87). 
An issue that has arisen with disturbing frequency is whether a debtor who 
acts in bad faith prior to, or in the course of, filing a Chapter 13 petition by, for 
example, fraudulently concealing significant assets, thereby forfeits his right to 
obtain Chapter 13 relief . . . .  [S]ome courts have suggested that even a bad-
faith debtor has an absolute right to convert at least one Chapter 7 proceeding 
into a Chapter 13 case even though the case will thereafter be dismissed or 
immediately returned to Chapter 7.  We granted certiorari to decide whether 
the Code mandates that procedural anomaly. 
Id. at 367-68. 
213. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 356 (“The opinions in Marrama R 
show rather than tell lower courts and litigants that the Supreme Court, to a greater or 
lesser extent, is nearly always likely to take a purposive approach to bankruptcy law 
interpretation; even the dissenters . . . consider purpose.”). 
214. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 370-71 (“We can discern neither a theoretical nor a 
practical reason that Congress would have chosen to treat a first-time motion to convert 
a chapter 7 case to chapter 13 under subsection 706(a) differently from the filing of a 
chapter 13 petition in the first instance.”). 
215. Id. at 371-72. 
216. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting “that, in general, 
legislative history is not an able guide here”). 
217. Id. (citation omitted); see Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286-87. 
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In Marrama, the Supreme Court emphasized the “purposes 
and policy” of bankruptcy law to aid in its interpretation.218  The 
Court used purpose, text, and congressional intent to reach its com­
monsense conclusion, but it seemed to consider purpose fore­
most.219  However, the Court has been inconsistent in the 
methodology it has applied to bankruptcy cases.220  This means that 
lower courts have not had a consistent example in interpreting 
bankruptcy law. 
Courts will make the fairest decisions when they look at the 
text of the statute in light of congressional purpose and the policy 
behind the Bankruptcy Code.  Some experts think “that apparent 
‘plain meaning’ should be checked against congressional purposes 
and policy effects on the bankruptcy system . . . , and not just when 
there is facial ambiguity in the text.”221  This might be taking the 
Marrama decision too far, however, when there is no ambiguity in 
the text.  In cases where there is a question about the correct mean­
ing of a provision, looking at the Code’s purpose may provide 
courts with an equitable solution for both debtors and creditors. 
This is especially critical to both debtors and creditors when it 
comes to vehicles, which are one of the largest purchases consumers 
will make in their lives.  Debtors rely on their cars.  Creditors do 
not wish to lose valuable collateral to a debtor having no personal 
liability, and thus no incentive to properly maintain the car. 
218. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 350 (“The Court’s emphasis on R 
purposes and policy as the primary basis of interpretation, and its de-emphasis of statu­
tory language, could not have come at a more dramatically significant time in the his­
tory of bankruptcy law.”); Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367, 371-72. 
219. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367; A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 355 R 
(“[T]he Court . . . de-emphasiz[es] the text of the statute itself, calling it merely ‘ade­
quate authority’ for its conclusion.”). 
220. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 356. The author discusses an- R 
other Supreme Court case in which the Court 
insists that there is a “plain meaning” to a bankruptcy provision with a clear 
drafting error as well as language that the majority concedes “may well be 
surplusage” under the Court’s reading.  The [Court] takes the position, how­
ever, that when there is a choice between an interpretation of a statute that 
treats part of it as surplusage and a reading that the statute is ambiguous, it is 
preferable to find surplusage in order to conclude that there is a plain 
meaning! 
Id. at 356-57 (discussing Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 549 U.S. 526, 534-36 (2004)). 
221. Id. at 357. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit Weighs In: The Dumont Decision 
The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to rule on the 
“ride-through” issue after the passage of BAPCPA.222  In allowing 
Ford Motor Credit Company to repossess a consumer’s automobile, 
the court first looked to the plain meaning of the Code.223  The 
court did not let plain meaning overrule commonsense, however. 
The court agreed “that BAPCPA is hardly the very model of a well-
drafted statute.  However, it is our task to interpret the laws as 
passed by Congress without attempting to force them to cohere 
more than their words allow.”224  The Ninth Circuit also noted that 
“[b]ecause of the importance of secured lending to the nation’s 
economy, secured creditors have been the subject of particular con­
gressional solicitude.  This policy can be seen in other provisions of 
BAPCPA, including one change which clearly reflects congressional 
concern for auto lenders.”225  The court looked to the changes in 
the cramdown provision of Chapter 13, which no longer allows 
debtors who had purchased a vehicle within 910 days of filing to pay 
the actual value of the vehicle.226  Instead, these debtors are respon­
sible for the full purchase price of the vehicle.227 
The Ninth Circuit looked to the United States Constitution to 
“observe that congressional power over bankruptcy affairs is lim­
ited by the constitutional requirement that the bankruptcy laws be 
‘uniform.’”228  The court then concluded that Congress intended to 
eliminate the “ride-through.”229 
It would raise serious constitutional questions for us to conclude 
that Congress affirmatively intended to promote the non-uniform 
system caused by the circuit split over ride-through . . . .  Given 
the amendment of section 521(a)(2) and the enactment of section 
362(h), it is unlikely that Congress failed to foresee that 
BAPCPA would have a major impact on ride-through. Accord­
ingly, we assume that Congress intended to make ride-through 
available in all circuits, or none.  The direction and tenor of the 
222. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1104. 
223. Id. at 1111. 
224. Id. at 1110-11. 
225. Id. at 1111. 
226. Id. 
227. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a)(5) (2006). 
228. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1112; U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress 
the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout 
the United States”). 
229. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1112. 
689 
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changes, which place new duties on debtors and create new sanc­
tions for failure to comply, suggest that Congress did not intend 
to increase access to ride-through by passing BAPCPA.230 
The court thus had no choice but to overturn its pre-BAPCPA 
decision in In re Parker.231 
In allowing the “ride-through” prior to BAPCPA’s passage, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that section 521(2) stated that it did 
nothing to change the rights of the debtor respecting the collat­
eral.232  The court noted that a debtor must not only file a statement 
of intention, but now the debtor “must indicate ‘either’ surrender 
‘or’ retention and if he chooses the latter, he must indicate ‘either’ 
redemption [or] reaffirmation.”233  BAPCPA’s new language made 
it clear to the Ninth Circuit that the “ride-through” was no more. 
Antoinette Dumont, the debtor in question, had chosen the reten­
tion option, but had failed to choose one of the listed alterna­
tives.234  She instead continued making payments for several 
months only to have her car repossessed without warning after her 
discharge.235  The court concluded that the discharge injunction did 
not protect her as a result of her failure to state one of the listed 
intentions.236 
The court in Dumont also relied on the fact that BAPCPA’s 
changes expressly granted debtors an exception to application of 
section 362(h) if the debtor attempted “to reaffirm on the original 
contract terms but was unable to complete such a reaffirmation due 
to the creditor’s refusal.”237 
Ride-through is functionally indistinguishable from reaffirmation 
on the original terms except for the lack of personal liability in 
the former.  The careful carve-out of reaffirmation on the con­
tract terms—a return to the status quo ante bankruptcy—implies 
that debtors who attempt to ride-through are subject to section 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 1113.  In Parker, the court found “that the only mandatory act is the 
filing of the statement of intention.” In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998). 
232. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006). 
233. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1109; 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C) (2006); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(h)(1)(A).  The Ninth Circuit also noted that “the ‘either . . . or’ disjunction has 
always meant that one of the listed alternatives must be satisfied.” Id. 
234. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1114. 
235. Id. at 1107. 
236. Id. at 1114.  The automatic stay remains in effect until a case is closed, dis­
missed, or discharge is granted or denied.  Upon discharge, there will be a new stay in 
effect under section 524. See 11 U.S.C. § 524. 
237. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1114; 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(B). 
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362(h).  If ride-through existed, any lawyer who advised his client 
to make a reaffirmation offer on the original contract terms 
would be guilty of malpractice, and any bankruptcy judge who 
approved such a reaffirmation from a pro se litigant would be 
seriously derelict in his duties.  For why would one ever choose 
reaffirmation on such terms and thus incur the risk of personal 
liability when one could safely achieve the same ends by ride-
through? . . .  Congress presumably would not have created an 
“exception” to provide access to an option all debtors had in the 
first place.238 
Looking at the statutory construction, the court then con­
cluded that “ride-through” was not an option for a debtor making 
no attempt to reaffirm her agreement with the creditor.239 
The Ninth Circuit relied on Congressional intent to help make 
its decision.  The question raised by Judge Graber in her dissent, 
however, is what part of the intent should be analyzed?240  Is it the 
intent of Congress in making the bankruptcy law uniform, as the 
majority concludes?  Is it the intent of Congress relating to resolu­
tion of the circuit split?  Or is it the intent of bankruptcy law in 
general? 
Judge Graber argued that Congress did not change the “if ap­
plicable” language of section 521(a)(2)(A) from the language of the 
old section 521(2), even though it must have known of the existing 
circuit split.241  “The legislative history is completely silent on the 
issue [of ride-through], with nary a reference to the vigorous public 
debate by the courts and commentators.  In my view, the changes to 
the text indicate an intent to perpetuate the extant circuit split, not 
resolve it.”242 
3. Moving Toward Uniformity 
Traditionally, bankruptcy law has relied upon the plain lan­
guage rule of statutory construction in interpreting its provisions. 
This approach has led to mass confusion in interpreting what is con­
sidered “plain language,” causing a disservice to debtors and credi­
tors doing their best to understand their rights. Marrama can be 
238. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1114. 
239. Id. at 1118. 
240. Id. at 1119-22 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
241. Id. at 1120-21. 
242. Id. at 1120.  The dissent also points out that more than one circuit had sug­
gested language that Congress could have used to make its intentions regarding the 
availability of the “ride-through” option clear. Id.; see In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 371 (3d 
Cir. 2004); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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used to support the importance of considering purpose.  Supporters 
of such a reading would apply a commonsense approach. 
For a not inconsiderable part of our history, the Supreme Court 
held that the “letter” (text) of a statute must yield to its “spirit” 
(purpose) when the two conflicted. Traditionally, the Court’s 
“purposivism” rested on the following intuitions: In our constitu­
tional system, federal courts act as faithful agents of Congress; 
accordingly, they must ascertain and enforce Congress’s com­
mands as accurately as possible . . . .  Ordinarily, a statutory text 
will adequately reflect its intended purpose . . . .  It is said that 
just as individuals sometimes inadvertently misstate their in­
tended meaning, so too does Congress.243 
In these cases, where commonsense dictates, courts must use 
all tools necessary and available to reach a fair reading of the stat­
ute.  Following this reasoning, when confronted with such a “mis­
statement,” it is up to the courts to try to apply the statute in 
question in the way in which Congress intended.244 
On the other side of the debate are those who believe that the 
plain meaning of the statute should be honored. They argue that 
“the final wording of a statute may reflect an otherwise unrecorded 
legislative compromise” that the courts should not second-guess.245 
Only a statute’s text, not its legislative history, is approved by both 
the House and the Senate.246 
Clearly, analyzing this issue from a plain meaning or an intent 
standpoint is not enough.  Looking at the words, intent, and the 
overarching purpose of the Code, to give a fresh start to the “hon­
est but unfortunate debtor”247 and balancing this with fairness to 
creditors, as well, is the only way to reach a result that is predictable 
and fair for all.  If courts use this approach, debtors and creditors 
243. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 70, 71-72 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
244. Id. at 72 (“[T]he Court long assumed that when the clear import of a stat­
ute’s text deviated sharply from its purpose . . . a judicial faithful agent could properly 
adjust the enacted text to capture what Congress . . . intended . . . .”). 
245. Id. at 74.  “In place of traditional conceptions of ‘actual’ legislative intent, 
modern textualists urge judges to focus on what they consider the more realistic—and 
objective—measure of how a ‘skilled, objectively-reasonable user of words’ would have 
understood the statutory text in context.” Id. at 75 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 
(1998)). 
246. Waldron & Berman, supra note 200, at 204 (“[The] focus on purpose was R 
critiqued as inconsistent with the process the Constitution provides for a bill to become 
law . . . .”). 
247. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007). 
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would go into bankruptcy proceedings understanding their rights. 
They would not have to fear courts interpreting provisions in crea­
tive ways, leading to uncertainty and possible loss of valuable 
property. 
There is also a fine line between allowing people to make their 
own decisions and being paternalistic.  Debtors are entitled to make 
their own decisions and their own mistakes.  If a debtor who de­
cides to file for bankruptcy has been able, despite her other finan­
cial woes, to keep current on her automobile loan, then she should 
be allowed to keep her car in most cases.  It is likely that the debtor 
has already been making sacrifices to do so; presumably she under­
stands the consequences of her decision. 
Yet at the same time, debtors whose bankruptcy schedules in­
dicated that there is insufficient money in the budget to meet all of 
their necessary living expenses while continuing to make car pay­
ments may be unrealistic in attempting to hold on to an automo­
bile.248  But this is precisely the type of debtor who may still get the 
benefit of the “ride-through.”  This seems like an absurd result. It 
is hard to believe that Congress intended those debtors who might 
have the hardest time continuing to make car payments to do so 
without fear of repossession.  Since Congress did not provide a rem­
edy for this situation, however, this is exactly the strange result with 
which we are left.  Precisely that debtor who may be least able to 
afford her vehicle gets to keep it per a nonrecourse loan with an 
unwilling lender. 
Secured creditors should be allowed to make their own deter­
minations on how much risk they are willing to assume.  Cars 
should not take on such mythic proportions to consumers that they 
are valued out of all relation with reality.  Courts do take into ac­
count, when approving or disapproving reaffirmation agreements, 
how far the debtor works from home, whether there are children or 
an ill family member involved, and other variables.249  These all fac­
tor into the equation when courts make their decisions to approve 
or deny reaffirmation agreements.  Even when a court disagrees 
248. When a debtor’s expenses exceed their income, a presumption of undue 
hardship arises, and courts are likely to review any attempted vehicle reaffirmations 
closely. See Lisa A. Napoli, Reaffirmation After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Con­
sumer Protection Act of 2005: Many Questions, Some Answers, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259, 
264-68 (2007). 
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A) (2006).  The court must review reaffirmation 
agreements for unrepresented debtors to determine such agreements are “not imposing 
an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.” Id.  Further, the court 
must determine that such agreement is “in the best interest of the debtor.” Id. 
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with a debtor’s perceived ability to pay and the risk of being liable 
for the full debt under reaffirmation, it may still approve an agree­
ment when all factors are considered.  There is a very fine line be­
tween being too paternalistic and watching out for debtors who are 
not sophisticated in bankruptcy and financial management in gen­
eral.  Pro se debtors, whose agreements courts must always review, 
are the best example of this. 
It is unclear what real effect denying a reaffirmation agreement 
will have, even in places where the “ride-through” is not an option. 
Secured lenders who are being paid may not feel motivated to re­
possess.250  While debtors whose reaffirmations are denied may be 
riskier, this risk might be worth it to a creditor whose only other 
option is to get what it can after incurring the costs of repossession. 
It is a gamble that could well pay off if a debtor manages to at least 
pay more than what the vehicle would fetch at auction. 
The downside is that debtors like Dumont, who may be strug­
gling to make payments they can ill afford to begin with, may end 
up throwing that money away when they wake up months later to 
find their car unexpectedly gone.  This leads to the debtors living 
with the same financial anxiety they had prior to filing, however, 
and is not very conducive to a “fresh start.” Maybe bankruptcy 
should cost consumers this price in exchange for forgiveness of their 
debts.  This is nothing new for debtors living in non-“ride-through” 
states, after all.  Perhaps Chapter 13 is a better option for those who 
are unwilling to live with such uncertainty while still retaining their 
cars. 
There is no easy solution.  Nevertheless, it seems that the 
“ride-through” is ended with the passage of BAPCPA. Looking at 
the relevant sections together, the intent seems clear.  If debtors are 
allowed to keep their cars with the protection of the automatic stay 
when their reaffirmation is not in their best interest, more harm 
than good may result.  Who knows where else the debtors are cut­
ting corners, perhaps on healthcare or food, in order to keep what 
is, after all, just an object. 
Most of all, commonsense tells us there must be some reason 
to go through the reaffirmation process—one that makes the 
debtor aware of the consequences of her actions. Why does section 
250. Repossession costs creditors about $8000 per vehicle. Behind on Car Pay­
ments? BBB Advice on How to Avoid the Repo Man, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU (Sept. 
4, 2009), http://centralflorida.bbb.org/WWWRoot/preview.centralflorida.bbb.org/ 
article/behind-on-car-payments-bbb-advice-on-how-to-avoid-the-repo-man-12364. 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE213.txt unknown Seq: 38 27-SEP-11 10:42 
694 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:657 
524(k) dictate all the precise language that must be included in such 
agreements if it does not matter?251  It seems that, sparse legislative 
history or not, looking objectively at all these sections put together, 
the next move after reaffirmation is denied should be decided by 
the creditor.  Just as giving up nonexempt assets is the price a Chap­
ter 7 debtor must pay to be given her “fresh start,” this is another 
consequence of having her other debts wiped out. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems that courts interpreting BAPCPA will still face chal­
lenges, as there are so many ways to interpret what is supposedly 
“plain language.”252  Courts relying solely on a “plain meaning” in­
terpretation may circumvent even Congress’s known intentions by 
using their own words against them.  As courts struggle to apply the 
Code, it is clear that relying on the “plain meaning” has not served 
bankruptcy law well, and has lead to uncertainty on the part of 
debtors and creditors.  By looking instead to the purpose behind 
the Bankruptcy Code, and using it to fairly interpret the provisions 
of the Act, courts may have an opportunity to provide more gui­
dance for those impacted by bankruptcy law. 
Keeping their vehicles is critical for some debtors to get the 
“fresh start” that bankruptcy promises.  There is a potential resolu­
tion to the “ride-through” issue that has split the courts for so long; 
courts must interpret BAPCPA in a way consistent with its name. 
Such an interpretation would strike a balance between those who 
would provide debtors with the option of keeping their vehicles as 
long as they are and remain current on their payments, and those 
who think it is only fair that creditors should have more protection 
for such a potentially valuable piece of secured property. The 
251. 11 U.S.C. § 524(k) (giving detailed requirements for creditor disclosure in 
reaffirmation agreements). 
252. See Napoli, supra note 248, at 261. R 
It will be interesting to see whether courts that have been instructed to strictly 
follow the plain language of the statute adhere to that rule in interpreting the 
new provisions, leaving it to Congress to fix any mistakes.  Of course, some 
judges who profess to follow that method of statutory interpretation seem to 
do so only when it brings about the result they desire. 
Id. (quoting Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing 
Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005”, 79 AM BANKR. L.J. 191, 192 (2005)).  On the other hand, this author points out 
that a “redeeming fact [of the Act] is that the legislation will not be interpreted or 
implemented by those who wrote it, but rather by reasonable human beings.” Id. 
695 
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Ninth Circuit, although denying the debtor the ability to keep her 
car, got it right. 
Allowing debtors the “ride-through” option only when a credi­
tor refuses to reaffirm on the same terms forestalls creditors from 
taking advantage of consumer debtors.  By forcing debtors to reaf­
firm and still be personally liable for this debt if they wish to retain 
their vehicle, debtors cannot take the easy way out and take advan­
tage of creditors.  Courts that look to the congressional purpose in 
revising the Bankruptcy Code, as well as to the purpose of bank­
ruptcy law in general, will create a solution that is as close to opti­
mal as possible under the circumstances.  It may not be a perfect 
system, but it is as good as it gets on this side of the looking glass. 
Allyson MacKenna* 
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